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Abstract
The role of economic uncertainty on macroeconomic uctuations has been studied
extensively in the literature. In the aftermath of the nancial crisis and in the process
of its exit from the EU, the UK is facing high levels of uncertainty on future economic
growth, investment, nancial markets etc. In this paper we investigate whether macro-
economic uncertainty a¤ects income, wage and consumption inequality. Our ndings
suggest that the measures of inequality increase in the aftermath of an uncertainty
shock but decrease in the medium to long run, converging to lower levels. Macro-
economic uncertainty appears to account signicantly for the variation of income and
consumption inequality. Using detailed micro data we decompose householdsincome
to investigate transmission channels where uncertainty shocks a¤ect di¤erently the
percentiles of income and consumption distributions. The nancial segmentation and
portfolio channels appear to play an important role in this heterogeneous response.
Keywords: Macroeconomic uncertainty, income inequality, consumption inequality,
SVAR
JEL codes: C32, D3, D8, E32.
1 Introduction
A decade after the Great Recession, most economies are recovering slowly with the world
economic growth in upward trend. Unemployment levels are low, scal balances have been
improved substantially and one would expect a similar picture for the levels of income and
wage inequality. However, OECD (2016) warns that income inequality remains at record
high levels in many countries despite declining unemployment and improving employment
rates. Some key facts are persistent: long term unemployment in low income households,
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slow wage growth for low and middle earners but most importantly redistribution policies,
which cushion the impact of crisis in its initial stage, have been weakened in many countries.
The picture in the UK appears to be di¤erent: the fast economic recovery was abruptly
interrupted by the European Union membership referendum in June 2016, increasing the
levels of economic and political uncertainty. Nevertheless, according to data on disposable
income coming from the latest waves of the Family Expenditure Survey (FES, 2016), income
inequality has not increased but remains to pre crisis levels. Cribb et al. (2017) show that
in 2016 income inequality measures such as the Gini Coe¢ cient and the 90:10 ratio are
roughly at the same levels of 1990s. Their upward trend have been interrupted by the
nancial crisis in 2007-8 mainly due to loss of real earnings in high income households and
rising social security benets. While inequality measures for wage and total consumption
have recovered some of their downward adjustments during the nancial crisis (see Figure
1), income inequality still remains at low levels. Cribb et al. (2017) report that real
earnings for median and high incomes have started to grow slowly while real benets for
low income families have slowed down. These facts lead some researchers to forecast that
the equality gains obtained during the Great Recession would be reversed by 2016 (see for
example Brewer et al., 2013). However, this has not happened yet: income inequality in
the UK (excluding the top and bottom 1%1) remains still at low levels.
The drivers of inequality have been extensively studied in the literature: Skill biased
technological change, trade openness and globalisation, nancial deepening and credit con-
straints, changes in labour markets structure and trade unionsstrength inuence inequal-
ity through a number of transmission mechanisms. These mechanisms vary in magnitude
across developed and emerging economies and in the short to long run (see for example
Acemoglu, 1998; Freeman, 2010; Roine et al., 2009; Western and Rosenfeld, 2011; Card,
2001). Demographic factors and individual characteristics such as the level of education,
return of schooling, family structure, gender, social mobility have been also found to be
important drivers (e.g. Knight and Sabot, 1983; Cunha and Heckman, 2007)
The redistributive role of the government through progressivity in taxation and social
security transfers is a strong determinant to equality especially for low income percentiles
(e.g. Heathcote et al., 2010). Finally, the role of monetary policy has been lately examined
and ndings suggest a positive impact of contractionary monetary policies and quantitative
easing to inequality (Coibion et al., 2017; Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou, 2017).
One of the factors which has been limited studied as a determinant of inequality is
1Cribb et al. (2017) nd that the household income held by the top 1% has increased during the same
time span and despite a substantial fall during the Great Recession, it has recovered fully and is at pre-
crisis levels. The authors use di¤erent data sources for these calculations as FES and FRS su¤er from under
reporting of the top high incomes.
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macroeconomic uncertainty. A number of studies2 have found that uncertainty shocks
a¤ect macroeconomic uctuations through their ability to a¤ect consumption, savings and
investment decisions. During periods of high uncertainty households decrease consumption
or postpone purchase of durables and increase their bu¤er stock of savings. Firms may
postpone investment in a wait and see state and prefer temporary to permanent workforce.
The labour market is a¤ected in terms of employment rate, hours worked and wage growth.
Uncertainty directly a¤ects nancial markets which experience high volatility of returns.
Credit conditions become tougher for rms and households who face greater di¢ culty to
obtain credit and higher costs as risk premia increase. A question that arises naturally
is whether households of di¤erent income, consumption and wage levels are a¤ected by
economic uncertainty in a similar way. However, most studies focus on the e¤ects of
uncertainty on aggregate data. As Deaton (2016) states: While we often must focus on
aggregates for macroeconomic policy, it is impossible to think coherently about national
well-being while ignoring inequality and poverty, neither of which is visible in aggregate
data.
Uncertainty shocks are found to amplify and prolong recessions. During recessions dif-
ferent percentiles of income, wage and consumption distributions are di¤erently a¤ected
(Heathcote et al., 2010). Guvenen et al. (2014) nd that US low wage workers experi-
ence downward movements and high volatility in their wage while high earners experience
only sluggish wage growth during economic slowdowns. Looking at the evolution of con-
sumption inequality in the US, Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014) found lower consumption
inequality during the Great Recession as the consumption of the 10th percentile falls sub-
stantially during this period. Gambetti and De Giorgi (2017) observe procyclical behaviour
of consumption inequality for the US especially for the right tail consumers who are more
exposed to economic uctuations. High consumption individuals are estimated to pay
three times more the cost of the business cycle relatively to other consumers. Finally,
when the researchers look at the impact of TFP and Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU)
on consumption distribution they nd signicant e¤ects on the top end of the distribution.
Top consumption percentiles reduce substantially their consumption levels in high EPU
periods relatively to the low ones and thus inequality in consumption falls. The impact of
the EPU on household income is also examined by Fischer et al. (2018) for the US states.
The authors nd that inequality falls in most states while there is high heterogeneity in
2There is a large literature on the channels by which uncertainty a¤ects the economy. Some indicative
studies include Bloom (2009), Bond et al. (2005), Bernanke (1983) on investment and productivity growth,
Benito (2006) and Eberly (1994) on consumption behaviour, Arellano et al. (2016), Alessandri and Bottero
(2017) on nancial markets and credit conditions. For a literature review on the impact on economic
uctuations see Bloom (2014).
3
terms of magnitude and duration. Di¤erent income composition across states leads to het-
erogeneous responses and fall in inequality is observed when capital income is relatively
higher.
To our knowledge, the last few studies are the only ones that look at the direct impact
of uncertainty, mostly of the EPU, on macroeconomy3. This paper attempts to shed new
light on the relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty and inequality. More specif-
ically, we investigate whether macroeconomic uncertainty shocks a¤ect earnings, income
and consumption inequality in the UK. This paper has two distinctive features: First, a
macroeconomic uncertainty index using a large macroeconomic and nancial dataset has
been constructed for the UK. Second, quarterly inequality measures have been constructed
by using survey microeconomic data. Thus both macroeconomic uncertainty and inequality
measures have been constructed by exploiting rich data environment, taking into account
householdscharacteristics and macroeconomic activity.
By using a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) we nd that macroeconomic
uncertainty shocks lead to lower inequality in earnings, income and consumption in the
medium and long run. These results remain invariant to alternative specications of the
VAR. The uncertainty shock makes important contributions to forecast error variance in
the inequality measures. In order to identify possible factors and channels of transmission
which led to the observed fall in inequality we estimate a SVAR using data for households
in di¤erent percentiles of each distribution. Results from this exercise suggest that the un-
certainty shock decreases wages and income for households at the middle and high end of
the distribution while households at the lower end are less a¤ected due mainly to redistrib-
utive policies and social security. This is consistent with wealthier households deriving a
comparatively larger proportion of their income from investments which falls substantially
during periods of higher uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the variables used in
the empirical analysis and the construction of inequality and uncertainty measures. Section
3 describes the estimation of the SVAR model and identication scheme. Section 4 presents
the main results for earnings, income and consumption, discusses issues of heterogeneity
and carries out robustness checks while Section 5 concludes.
3A recent theoretical study by Kasa and Lei (2017) focuses on the role of uncertainty on wealth inequality.
The authors show that when top wealth agents confront Knightian uncertainty chose robust portfolio policies
and invest a large part of their wealth in higher yielding assets while low wealth households chose safer
assets as they are more risk averse. This investment behaviour amplies wealth inequality. However, the
results may vary substantially for income and consumption inequality in samples where the top 1% of
households is excluded.
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2 Data
In this section we describe the variables used from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES),
the construction of measures of inequality and the construction of macroeconomic uncer-
tainty measure for the UK.
2.1 The Family Expenditure Survey variables
The data for income wage and consumption are drawn from the Family Expenditure Survey
(FES) from 1970 to 2016. The FES is an annual survey which provides detailed information
on demographics, income, expenditure and consumption for on average of a representative
sample of 7,000 UK households per year. The households who participate on FES are asked
to keep a diary with their spending of a two week period. In 2001 FES merged with the
National Food Survey and became the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) and with the
Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS) in 20084. Even though the FES has been running
from 1957 there are discontinuities and small samples prior to 1968 and for this reason solid
inequality measures can be constructed from 1969. Some studies (see for example Foster,
1996, van de Ven, 2011) point out representation problems with the survey: FES tends
to over represent mortgage holders, people living in the countryside, older households
and under represents people living in council ats, institutions (e.g. retirement homes,
military), no xed address holders, ethnic minorities, self employed, manual workers and
younger households. Compared to National Accounts, some sources of income such as
earnings and social security benets closely match National Accounts distributions while
there is some under-reporting of investment income and self employment earnings (Banks
and Johnson, 1998)
The variable we use for disposable income is dened as weekly household income net of
taxes and national insurance contributions. It is summed across all members living in the
same household. After keeping only the positive values and trimming, there are on average
6,900 households per year until 2006 and then the average drops to 5,600 per year. Thus,
in total there are around 305,000 household income observations for the whole sample
period. The income variable is equivalised for the family size by dividing the income of
each household by the square root of the number of individuals living in the household.
The variable for gross wage is the normal gross wage from any type of occupation
before taxes including national insurance contributions and other deductions and bonuses.
Gross wage is at individual level, converted to weekly amounts5. Taking into account
4 In 1993-94 the FES changes from calender year to nancial year (April to March) and the EFS goes
back to the calender year in 2006.
5 If the individual works full time, the weekly payment is dened as earnings, while in the case of a part
5
only positive values there are on average 7,000 observations per year or around 320,000
observations over the 46 year period. Inequality measures constructed from data on wages
have smaller measurement error than other forms of income.
The denition for the total consumption variable comes from National Accounts which
is the sum of housing, food, alcohol, tobacco, fuel, light and power, clothing and footwear,
durable household goods, other goods, transport, vehicles and services. Households to-
tal consumption is divided by the number of people living in the household to construct
consumption per capita.
The distributions of all three variables have been trimmed by removing the top and
bottom 1%. Even though the tails of the distributions may give highly heterogeneous
responses during economic uncertainty, they are likely to contain measurement errors as
their inclusion causes erratic shifts in the inequality measures. Thus we follow the existing
literature on this issue (see for instance Brewer and Wren-Lewis, 2012) and trim the tails
by 1%. All variables have been deated by the CPI.
2.2 Measures of Inequality
Three measures of inequality are constructed for each FES variable: the Gini coe¢ cient
of levels, which takes values between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (perfect inequality), the
cross sectional standard deviation of log levels which removes zero values, reducing this
way sensitivity to extreme values and lastly the di¤erences between individual percentiles
of the cross sectional distribution of the log levels (e.g. 90thP  10thP , 50thP  10thP , etc.)
for each period. An important feature of this dataset, which allows a closer observation of
inequality responses, is the quarterly frequency of the inequality measures. This is achieved
by assigning households to di¤erent quarters within a year based on the date of the survey
interview (Cloyne and Surico, 2017).
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the Gini coe¢ cient for disposable income, total con-
sumption and gross personal wage from 1970 to 2016 for the UK. All measures depict an
upward trend for the period examined with the most dramatic rise taking place in the
second decade of the sample. More specically, the sample period starts with a fall of
inequality in the beginning of the 1970s which remains at low levels until the end of the
decade. The observed fall in inequality is achieved mostly through labour earnings as high
earners experienced fall of their real wages relative to low earners. This period is also
characterised by an increase in relative earnings for women and pensioners, accompanied
by monetary easing in the second half of 1970s (Nelson, 2001).
During the 1980s, the unemployment rate increased dramatically, peaking at 12% in
time or odd job, the last payment is counted.
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1984. The same period is characterised by a dramatic increase of inequality especially in
disposable income. This has been attributed to higher unemployment in low income house-
holds, lower working hours of the employed, more part time contracts and higher dispersion
of wages between low and high earners (Brewer and Wren-Lewis, 2012).The highest rise
observed was that of disposable income inequality. Even though income inequality was at
its lowest in the beginning of the sample period, it catches up rapidly with consumption
inequality in mid 1980s. Financial liberalisation and more consumption loans available
enabled many low income households to achieve a level of consumption which was not
entirely supported by their income.
Fall of investment income and the burst of the dotcom bubble in the beginning of
2000s, contributed to fall of inequality in income and earnings. In 2007 nancial markets
collapsed and the Great Recession which followed, caused a deep fall in all inequality
measures, especially in consumption. During this period low income families experienced
real increases in benet income which is a substantial part of their total income while
middle and high income families experienced large falls in their real earnings. Interestingly,
the Gini coe¢ cients for consumption and earnings rose substantially after 2010 while the
one for disposable income remains at low levels. During the recovering period (2010-12),
income inequality remained low mainly due to increase of employment among workless
households (less individuals lived in a workless household) while employment rates in high
income households did not change (Beleld et al., 2017). During the last period of the
sample (2013-16) income inequality remains low and unchanged (around 0.31). It is equal
to 1985 levels although real earnings have started to grow slowly and real benets have
slowed down.
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Figure 1: The Gini Coe¢ cient (4 quarter moving average) for disposable income, total consumption and gross wage for the UK from
1970 to 2016. The data is from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and its successive surveys (see Section 2.1) Shaded areas
represent recessions as identied by the OECD.
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Figure 2: UK Macroeconomic Uncertainty for horizons (h) one to four quarters ahead. The vertical lines indicate major economic and
political events for the UK. The data are quarterly and span the period 1971Q1:2016Q1
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2.3 The Measure of Uncertainty
To construct the measure of macroeconomic uncertainty for the UK we follow closely the
methodology described in Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015). The main characteristics of
this measure are that it is derived by using a large number of macroeconomic and nancial
variables, it is not related to the structure of theoretical models but most importantly it
focuses on the evolution of the non forecastable component of each variable. The authors
argue that when this component increases, the economy becomes less predictable and this
is how uncertainty increases.
Summarising the model in Jurado et al. (2015), the h period ahead uncertainty (Uyjt(h))
of the variable yjt 2 Yt = (y1t:::yNyt)0 is the conditional volatility of the non forecastable
part of the future value of the series which is dened as:
Uyjt(h) =
q
E [yjt+h   (Eyjt+hjIt)]2 jIt; (1)
where It is the information set available to economic agents at period t. If the expec-
tation today on the forecast error of the variable yjt; yjt+h   (Eyjt+hjIt) rises then the
uncertainty on this variable rises as well. Note that the whole forecastable component
of the variable yj has been removed before calculating its conditional volatility, otherwise
sizable forecastable variations will be mistakenly categorised as uncertainty. This is one of
the main features of this uncertainty measure.
The measure of macroeconomic uncertainty can be constructed by using a weighted
average of the uncertainty for each variable for period t:
Uyt (h)  p lim
Ny !1
NyX
j=1
wjU
y
jt(h)  Ew
h
Uyjt(h)
i
; (2)
where wj are aggregation weights for each period. By using a large number of variables
this measure is not based on the countercyclical volatility of an idiosyncratic shock but
takes the common variation across all variables in the sample.
To obtain the estimates for the individual uncertainties in (1) and to construct the
aggregate measure in (2) we rst have to produce the forecast E [yjt+hjIt] for each variable.
The forecasted value of the variable yj for the period h  1 is given by the following factor
augmented model:
yjt+1 = 
y
j (L)yjt + 
F
j (L)F^t + 
W
j (L)Wt + v
y
jt+1;
where yj ; 
F
j and 
W
j are nite order lag polynomials, F^t are the factors coming from
the information set available at time t It and it comprises the full data set of all macroeco-
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nomic, nancial and global series,Wt are additional predictors. To generate time varying
uncertainty in yjt; the prediction error in yjt;and the forecast errors in factors F^ and W
are all allowed to have stochastic volatilities yj ; 
F
k ; 
W
l for one step ahead forecast.
To obtain the forecasts for yjt, a Factor Augmented Autoregression model (FAVAR) is
employed. The stacked vectors in the FAVAR system are Yjt = (yjt; yjt 1:::yjt+q 1)0 and
Zt  (Zt:::Zt q+1)0 where Z is the vector which collects all factors estimated and additional
predictors, Zt  (F^t;Wt)0: The system has the following form: 
Zt
Yjt
!
=
"

Z 0
0j 
Y
j
# 
Zt 1
Yjt 1
!
+
 
v
Z
t
vYjt
!
: (3)
A parametric stochastic volatility model has been employed to give to conditional
volatilities of shocks v Zt and v
Y
jt time variation. It is worth noting that the time varying
volatilities of factors and predictorserrors create additional unforcasted volatility in yjt
and contribute further to its uncertainty. Thus, the time varying variance of the forecast
error of both Yjt and Zt is dened as:

jt(h) = 
Y
j 
jt(h  1)(Yj )0 + Et

vYjt+h
 
vYjt+h
0
:
After the variance of the forecast error has been derived, the h period ahead uncer-
tainty for each variable yjt can be easily computed following (1). Finally, the aggregate
macroeconomic uncertainty can be calculated by (2).
2.4 Data for the macroeconomic uncertainty measure
The measure of macroeconomic uncertainty has been constructed by using 51 UK time
series as described in Appendix II. These series try to cover various aspects of the UK
economic activity spanning from 1970:Q1 to 2016:Q3. Even though there are many UK
series starting as early as the 1950s not many run in a quarterly frequency and are continued
until 2016. This was the main limitation for constructing a measure starting from 1970.
A much larger number of quarterly series is available for a later date (for example starting
form 1975). The areas covered in this dataset are the following: Output, Production and
Investment, Employment, Housing, Trade, Prices, Interest and Exchange Rates, Financial
Markets, Money and Credit, Government and World Macroeconomic Variables. Most series
come from the O¢ ce of National Statistics (ONS), Global Financial Data (GFD), Bank
of England (BOE), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
and St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). Series have been transformed and
seasonally adjusted when needed. Details can be found in Appendix II.
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The main specication in the empirical analysis below uses the following macroeconomic
variables: (1) GDP per capita and in real terms (code=ABMI, ONS divided by population).
(2) Ination based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI series is based on the
seasonally adjusted harmonized index of consumer prices spliced with the retail price index
excluding mortgage payments. (3) The three month treasury bill rate. Both series are
obtained from the BOE Database (4) The Gini Coe¢ cient for disposable income, gross
wage and total consumption as described in Section 2.2 (5) the FTSEALL Index which is
obtained from Global Financial Data and (6) the measure of macroeconomic uncertainty
estimated by the model described in Section 2.3 and using the data described in Section
2.4 and Appendix II.
3 Empirical Model
In order to estimate the impact of uncertainty shocks on the constructed inequality mea-
sures we use a Structural VAR model. The benchmark model is dened as:
Zt = c+
PX
j=1
BjZt j + vt; (4)
where vt~N(0;
). The matrix of endogenous variables includes the standard set used for
small open economies: i.e. the growth of real GDP per capita, CPI ination, the three
month treasury bill rate, the growth of the FTSE ALL index. The VAR model is augmented
with the estimated index of uncertainty and each of the inequality measures described
above, in order to estimate the impact of uncertainty shocks on inequality related to income,
earnings or consumption. More specications with alternative proxies for uncertainty and
inequality have been tried in the sensitivity analysis. All variables except the interest rate
and the inequality measure enter in log di¤erences. The lag length P is set to 4 in the
specications above.
We adopt a Bayesian approach to estimation and use a Gibbs sampling algorithm to
approximate the posterior distribution of the model parameters. As discussed in Uhlig
(2005), this approach o¤ers a convenient method to estimate error bands for impulse re-
sponses. However, the prior used is at and, therefore, the results reported are data driven.
The estimation algorithm is described in detail in the Appendix I.
3.1 Identication of the uncertainty shock
The covariance matrix of the residuals 
 can be decomposed as 
 = A0A00 where A0
represents the contemporaneous impact of the structural shocks "t:
vt = A0"t: (5)
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In the benchmark model we use Cholesky decomposition to calculate the A0 matrix, order-
ing uncertainty last following Jurado et al. (2015). This implies that uncertainty shocks
a¤ect the rest of the variables after one period. In the robustness section we consider more
variations of the benchmark model by trying alternative shock identication strategies (see
Section 4.3). First we order macroeconomic uncertainty rst to allow uncertainty to a¤ect
contemporaneously all other variables, following Bloom (2009). Second, following Ludvig-
son et al. (2018) we put sign and magnitude restrictions on the shocks during signicant
historical episodes and we restrict also the correlation among the shocks and nancial vari-
ables. In all alternative identication strategies employed the results remain robust (see
Figure 9).
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Figure 3: E¤ects of the macroeconomic uncertainty shock on UKs macroeconomic variables. The gure presents impulse response
functions of macroeconomic variables to one standard deviation uncertainty shock. Each raw represents a SVAR model which has
been augmented by the Gini Coe¢ cient of Income, Wage and Consumption respectively. The vertical axis of each plot measures the
response in percent. The horizontal axis indicates time in quarters. The red line is the median estimate and the shaded area is the
68% error band.
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4 The response of inequality measures to uncertainty shocks
Figure 3 presents the results from the benchmark VAR model. Each row shows the re-
sponse to a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty at t = 0 using the VAR model
that includes the Gini coe¢ cient on disposable income, gross wage and total consumption
respectively.
The responses of the macroeconomic variables to uncertainty shock are the following: In
the rst model where the Gini coe¢ cient of disposable income has been used as a measure
of inequality, a one standard deviation macroeconomic uncertainty shock (a rise of 0.15
units of the uncertainty index) generates a 0.5 percentage point peak drop in output growth
after a year, while the CPI ination rate increases by 0.6 percent in the rst quarter. This
stagation phenomenon is possibly due to the upward pricing bias channel where rms
prefer to set prices toward the higher end of their price spectrum during periods of high
uncertainty as it is less costly in terms of adjustment costs to increase them further if a
large shock occurs (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2015). Mumtaz (2016) looks at the time
varying impact of uncertainty shocks in the UK and nds a positive ination response
during the 1970s and 80s which becomes smaller in the subsequent two decades. The
central bank seems to respond to the fall of output by lowering interest rates: the 3 month
T-Bill rate falls, reaching a maximum drop of 0.3 percent after two years. The stock
market experiences losses and the FTSEALL is negatively e¤ected with peak response of
8 percent after two quarters. These variables follow similar behaviour in the other two
models depicted in rows 2 and 3 of Figure 3 where the Gini coe¢ cients for wage and
consumption have been used as inequality measures.
The inequality measure in all three models follows an unexpected path: it increases
in the short run but then it falls dramatically and remains at a lower level in the long
run. More specically, the Gini coe¢ cient for income increases by 0.24 percent in the third
quarter and then starts falling with peak drop of 0.5 percent after four years. The fact
that income inequality increases in the short run may reect a fall in labour supply and
amount of hours worked. An increase in wage dispersion cannot fully explain the observed
increase in income inequality in the short run as wages can be sticky and for the Gini
of wage response, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of being equal to zero in the rst
quarters
The wage inequality, which follows a similar path to income but of a smaller magnitude,
becomes statistically signicant after 18 periods. When the standard deviation of log
levels or the di¤erence in percentiles are used as a measure of wage inequality, the IRF
of wage follows a similar pattern but becomes signicant after a year (see Figure 7). The
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more pronounced response is the one by the consumption inequality measure which has a
maximum fall of 0.6 percent after about two years.
Overall we can summarise the benchmark ndings as follows: A positive macroeconomic
uncertainty shock increases the Gini coe¢ cient of all variables in the short run but the null
hypothesis can be rejected only in the case of disposable income. In the medium run, the
Gini coe¢ cients fall in lower levels and remain there for a long period. This response is
robust in all specications we tried in the sensitivity analysis and the null hypothesis that
this e¤ect is equal to zero can be rejected in all cases.
4.1 Heterogeneity of responses to uncertainty shocks
In order to understand the possible reasons behind the response of inequality measures
shown in Figure 3 we consider how households and individuals at di¤erent points on the
distribution respond to the uncertainty shocks identied above. In particular, for each
variable, we consider households and individuals that fall within the following percentiles
in a given quarter: P1 =

2nd : 19th

; P2 =

20th : 39th

; P3 = [40
th : 59th]; P4 = [60
th :
79th]; P5 = [80
th : 98th]. We then construct measures of average real wage, real income and
real per-capita consumption within these percentiles. To examine how the shock a¤ects the
tails of each distribution relative to its median we also calculate the di¤erences P5  P3 and
P3 P1 These di¤erences are then included in the SVAR along with the ve macroeconomic
variables used above and their response to the uncertainty shock is examined. The shock
is identied by using the same recursive scheme as in the benchmark model.
The heterogeneous responses of the uncertainty shock in the distributions of income,
earnings and consumption can be seen in Figure 4. In the rst panel of Figure 4 the
di¤erence between P1 (low income households) from its median (P3) falls substantially and
to a much higher magnitude than the di¤erence between high income households from the
median (P5   P3). More specically, the peak response of P3   P1 is -1% after 10 periods
while the one for P5 P3 is about -0.5 % indicating that income inequality falls by more in
the left part of the income distribution. Inequality in the right part of the distribution also
falls but by a much smaller magnitude, indicating that high and median income households
are a¤ected by the shock in a similar way.
This can possibly reect the fact that during periods of high uncertainty, high and me-
dian household incomes decrease while low incomes are partly supported by social security
benets. This argument is in line with the ndings of Coibion et al. (2017) for the US and
Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou (2017) for the UK who decompose householdsincome and
nd a higher percentage of income coming from nancial investments and wages for high
income households while low income households are partly supported by social benets
16
when they experience loss of income and wage in periods of economic slowdown. Similar
results are depicted by Beleld et al. (2017) explaining why the UK experienced lower
income inequality after the Great Recession.
In Figure 5 we decompose UK households income and consumption from 1995 to
2015 to three main sources: wage, social security benets and investment income. The
decomposition reveals that wage is the main source of income for median (56%) and high
percentiles (68-70%) and investment income has a signicant contribution (around 7.5%)
to the highest percentile. Social benets, on the other hand, appear to be a very signicant
source of income and consumption for households in the rst percentile (79.5%) while for
the fth percentile is less signicant (11%). Thus median and high income households
are more a¤ected in terms of income and consumption during periods of high uncertainty
and recession as wages and investment proceeds become more volatile while low income
households are largely sustained by social security benets.
In terms of wage distribution, we can see from the second panel of Figure 4 that the
di¤erence between low and median earners is decreasing about one year after the shock
while the response of the di¤erence among high earners is not statistically signicant. This
is in line with the ndings of Heathcote et al. (2010) for the US earnings distribution.
More specically, the authors nd that earnings dynamics are more important for high
percentiles of the earnings distribution as their earnings are more volatile to the business
cycle. On the other hand, labour market characteristics such as institutional constraints on
minimum wage, unionspower and hours worked are more important for low percentiles.
Therefore, uncertainty shocks can generate a decrease in earnings growth which is more
pronounced and uniform for the second half of the earnings distribution such that P5 P3
appears to be statistically insignicant while the low percentiles are more immune to wage
drops due to institutional constraints. This is why P3   P1 becomes smaller and earnings
inequality falls in the rst half of the income distribution.
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Figure 4: Distributional e¤ects of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks by percentiles. The
gure reports the impulse response functions of log di¤erences between the 50th and 10th
percentiles (P50 P10, red solid line) and between the 90th and the 50th percentile (P90 
P50, blue central line) to one standard deviation uncertainty shock for the distributions of
income, wage and consumption. The shaded area in the case of the P50  P10 di¤erence
and the two external blue lines in the case of the P90 P50 represent 68% error bands. The
IRFs are measured in percentage changes (vertical axis) while the horizontal axis reports
time in quarters.
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Figure 5: Income and Consumption decomposition by percentile. The gure reports the
proportions of gross wage, social security benets and investment income in Disposable
Income (blue bars) and Total Consumption (yellow bars) for each percentile. The data
used for this gure are 5 year averages over the period 1975-2015, from the FES.
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Figure 6: Percentage contribution of uncertainty shocks to the forecast error variance (FEV) of all macroeconomic variables. The
fourth column reports the shocks contribution to the FEV of Gini Coe¢ cients for income, wage and consumption respectively. The
solid line is the median estimate and the shaded area is the 68% error band. The vertical axis measures percentage change and the
horizontal time in quarters.
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4.2 The contribution of uncertainty shocks to inequality
Figure 6 plots the contribution of the macroeconomic uncertainty shock to the forecast
error variance (FEV) of the Gini coe¢ cients. The estimated median contribution of this
shock ranges from around 10% at the three year horizon for income, is smaller for wage
while for total consumption it amounts to about 20% in the FEV at a two year horizon.
Similar estimates are found when the standard deviation of logs or the di¤erence of the
90thP = 10thP are considered as measure of inequality. This suggests that uncertainty
shocks make a contribution to inequality that is important both from an economic and
statistical perspective.
4.3 Robustness of the results
We check the robustness of the results from three perspectives: First, we try di¤erent mea-
sures of inequality such as the standard deviation of log levels and the 90thP  10thP di¤er-
ence. Second, to deal with the problem of informational deciency in a conventional VAR
we augment the benchmark VAR with factors extracted from the whole macroeconomic
and nancial data set. Third, we try di¤erent identication schemes for the uncertainty
shock. Despite some di¤erences in magnitude, overall the results remain robust in all cases.
Measures of Inequality: Two alternative measures of inequality are the standard devi-
ation of the log levels of income, wage and consumption and the di¤erence between the
90th and 10th percentiles. The advantage of the former is that it decreases the inuence
of outliers in highly skewed data while the latter compares directly two parts of the dis-
tribution without referring to the whole distribution and the statistics are easily read. By
using the standard deviation of log levels we nd similar results to the Gini coe¢ cients
in the benchmark specication and the impact is of the same magnitude (see Figure 7,
second column). The fall in wage inequality is more pronounced and signicant in this
case. Similar impulse responses are produced when we use the di¤erence in percentiles
as a measure. In this case the magnitude is greater in all three variables, reaching, for
example, -1% peak response in income compared to benchmark which is -0.5% (Figure 7,
third column).
Informational su¢ ciency: To account for the fact that agents typically have access
to a large information set while a conventional VAR can handle only a limited number
of variables, we adopt the solution proposed by Forni and Gambetti (2014) and estimate
a Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR). We augment the benchmark VAR by two principal
components computed by the 52 macroeconomic and nancial time series to ensure or-
thogonality and solve recersively. The Granger causality test indicates that informational
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Figure 7: Sensitivity in the measure of inequality : The impulse response functions of Gini
coe¢ cients (rst column), standard deviation of log levels (second column) and 90thP  
10thP (third column) to one standard deviation uncertainty shock. The vertical axis of
each plot shows the response in percent. The red line is the median estimate and the
shaded area is the 68% condence bands.
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Figure 8: Sensitivity in the information set : The impulse response functions of Gini coe¢ -
cients to one standard deviation uncertainty shock. Two principal components derived by
a FAVAR model have been added in the benchmark VAR. The vertical axis of each plot
shows the response in percent. The red line is the median estimate and the shaded area is
the 68% condence bands.
su¢ ciency is no longer rejected. The results remain similar to the benchmark experiment:
As Figure 8 shows, the Gini coe¢ cient falls for all three variables in a similar pattern and
magnitude to the benchmark. In the case of gross wage, the null cannot be rejected.
Measures of Uncertainty: Next, we try two di¤erent proxies for the uncertainty mea-
sure. First, following Bloom (2009) we use the daily volatility of the FTSEALL index. The
stock market volatility is constructed by using a quarterly average of the monthly realised
volatility of FTSEALL which is HP detrended. A recursive identication strategy has
been employed and the ordering of the variables has been altered to match Bloom (2009),
ordering the returns of FTSEALL rst, the stock market volatility second and keeping the
inequality measure last. The impulse response functions of the main macroeconomic vari-
ables are similar to Blooms (2009) and to the benchmark. The results indicate that stock
market volatility shocks have a negative impact on Gini coe¢ cients for income, wage and
consumption (see Figure 9, second column). Intuitively, large volatility shocks in nancial
markets will decrease income from nancial assets and investments. This a¤ects mostly
households in high income percentiles as it can be seen in income decomposition (Figure
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5) decreasing this way income inequality. The Gini coe¢ cient for consumption decreases
in the short run. Consumption levels of households in low percentiles are sustained partly
through social security while higher percentiles smooth their consumption patterns and
temporary loss of income does not have a long run e¤ect on their consumption (Mumtaz
and Theophilopoulou, 2017).
The second proxy for uncertainty used is the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) as
dened in Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). The UK historical news based index from
the authorsweb site has been used as it has the longer span but it ends in 2008. The
newer series available start from 1997 and cannot be matched with the old ones as di¤erent
newspapers have been used. In this experiment we use the same identication strategy and
similar ordering to the authors by ordering EPU rst. The results can be seen in Figure
9, third column. The impulse response functions are similar to the benchmark: inequality
falls for all three variables in the long run. In the short run, there is an increase of Gini for
income and wage which matches the benchmark results but in this case the null hypothesis
can be clearly rejected.
Identication strategies of the macroeconomic uncertainty shock :
The benchmark model has been estimated by using a recursive identication scheme
as described in Section 3.1. In this section we explore the sensitivity in the identication
strategy by rstly altering the order of the variables in the recursive scheme and secondly
by imposing event and correlation constraints on the structural shock in conjunction with
sign restriction on the A0 matrix.
First, we experiment with di¤erent ordering in the Cholesky decomposition and order
the macroeconomic uncertainty rst as in Bloom (2009). This implies that a shock in
macroeconomic uncertainty has an instant e¤ect in all other variables. This impact can
be seen in Figure 9, rst column. Figure 9 shows that the main results remain unchanged:
increase in macroeconomic uncertainty improves the equality measure for income, wage and
consumption in the long run. In the short run, only the Gini for consumption experiences
briey a small increase by 0.3%.
We put minimal sign restrictions on the A0 matrix to impose that macroeconomic
uncertainty and output move on opposite directions on the impact. However, these re-
strictions are not su¢ cient to disentangle uncertainty shocks from the rest of the shocks.
Therefore, following the identication strategy in Ludvigson et al. (2018) we impose two
types of shock-based restrictions: i) event constraints and ii) correlation constraints.
The event constraints impose the uncertainty shock to be larger than one standard
deviation from their mean during the ERM crisis and Black Wednesday (1992Q4). The
uncertainty shock is also restricted to be larger than one standard deviation at least once
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during the nancial crisis (2008Q1-2009Q2). We also impose that shocks to GDP growth
during the same period must be less than one standard deviation to exclude solutions which
imply large positive shocks to output during that period.
As in Ludvigson et al. (2018), the uncertainty shock can a¤ect stock premia and should
be negatively correlated to stock returns. The correlation constraint is  <  0:05 implying
a negative correlation between the uncertainty shock and stock returns. The results can
be seen in the last column of Figure 9. All three IRFs of the Gini coe¢ cients follow similar
paths to the benchmark. In this identication scheme, the drop in inequality measures is
clear, distinct and persistent.
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Figure 9: Sensitivity in the information set and identication strategy : The impulse response functions of Gini coe¢ cients to one
standard deviation macroeconomic uncertainty shock. The rst column shows the results of a recursive ordering where the measure of
uncertainty has been ordered rst. For the results in the second column the daily volatility of the FTSEALL Index has been used as
measure of uncertainty while in the third column the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index has been used. The fourth column
depicts results where shock-based restrictions have been used to identify the uncertainty shock. The vertical axis of each plot shows
the response in percent. The red line is the median estimate and the shaded area is the 68% condence bands.
26
5 Conclusions
A growing empirical literature has demonstrated the negative impact of uncertainty shocks
on macroeconomic variables. However, little has been researched on its relationship with
economic inequality and its distributional e¤ects. This paper attempts to bridge this
gap and sheds light on the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on income, wage and
consumption inequality for the UK.
We build quarterly historical time series for the measures of inequality exploring micro-
economic data from the Family Expenditure Survey. We then use a data rich environment
in terms of macroeconomic and nancial time series to construct the uncertainty measure
for the UK. By employing a structural VAR model we estimate the impact of uncertainty
shocks on UK inequality. Our ndings suggest that positive uncertainty shocks decrease
inequality measures after about a year and this drop is signicant and persistent. Our
results remain robust in alternative measures of inequality, uncertainty, specications of
the model and identication strategies for the structural shock. Uncertainty shocks explain
a signicant proportion of the uctuations in the inequality measures with a contribution
to their variance estimated to be from 10 to 20 percent.
To explain this drop in inequality and understand distributional implications we exam-
ine how di¤erent percentiles of income, wage and consumption distributions react to the
uncertainty shock. We nd that households and individuals on the right part of distrib-
utions are the ones mostly a¤ected by an increase in uncertainty. This is because their
labour and nancial incomes are more exposed to economic uctuations. On the other
hand, macroeconomic uncertainty seems to play a small role on income uctuations for
households in low percentiles as social security benets and institutional constraints seem
to be more important determinants. This is also documented by decomposing income and
consumption distributions into their main sources.
Although macroeconomic uncertainty shocks have a well documented negative impact
on the economy, we nd that this is also the case for inequality. The main reason is that high
income households seem to be more adversely a¤ected through the portfolio composition
and labour earnings channels than low income households who rely signicantly on transfers
during periods of economic slowdown.
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1 Appendix I: Estimation algorithm for Bayesian VAR
Consider the VAR model:
Zt = c+
PX
j=1
BjZt j + vt; (1)
where vt~N(0;
). Following Uhlig (2005) we use Gibbs sampling to draw from the posterior of
the VAR coe¢ cients. The algorithm involves drawing successively from the conditional posterior
distribution of the VAR coe¢ cients and covariance. Note that while a Bayesian numerical approach
is adopted, we employ at priors and thus place all the weight on the information from the data.
This section provides details on the algorithm used.
The VAR can be written compactly as:
Yt = XtB + vt; (2)
with Yt = Zt; Xt = fci; Yit 1; Yit 2:::; Yit pg:Note that as each equation in the VAR has identical
regressors, it can be re-written as:
y = (IN 
X) b+ V; (3)
where y = vec(Yt) and b = vec(B) and V = vec(vt):.Assume that the prior for the VAR coe¢ cients
b is normal and given by:
p(b)~N

~b0; H

; (4)
where ~b0 is a (N  (N  P + 1))  1 vector which denotes the prior mean while H is a is a
[N  (N  P + 1)] [N  (N  P + 1)] matrix where the diagonal elements denote the variance of
the prior.
It can be shown that the posterior distribution of the VAR coe¢ cients conditional on  is
normal (see Kadiyala and Karlsson, 1998). That is the conditional posterior for the coe¢ cients is
given by H (bj; Yt) ~N (M; V ) where:
M =
 
H 1 +  1 
X 0tXt
 1 
H 1~b0 +  1 
X 0tXtb^

; (5)
V  =
 
H 1 +  1 
X 0tXt
 1
;
where b^ is a (N  (N  P + 1))1 vector which denotes the OLS estimates of the VAR coe¢ cients
in vectorised format b^ = vec

(X 0tXt)
 1
(X 0tYt)

: The conjugate prior for the VAR covariance
matrix is an inverse Wishart distribution with prior scale matrix S and prior degrees of freedom :
p()~IW
 
S; 

: (6)
1
Given the prior in equation 6, the posterior for  conditional on b is also inverse WishartH (nb; Yt) ~IW
 
; T + 

where T is the sample size and
 = S + (Yt  XtB)0 (Yt  XtB) : (7)
Note that B denotes the VAR coe¢ cients reshaped into (N  P + 1) by N matrix.
The Gibbs sampling algorithm for the VAR model consists of the following steps:
Step 1 Set priors for the VAR coe¢ cients and the covariance matrix. As discussed above, the prior
for the VAR coe¢ cients is normal and given by p(b)~N

~b0; H

. The prior for the covariance
matrix of the residuals  is inverse Wishart and given by IW
 
S; 

: Set a starting value for
 (e.g. the OLS estimate of ).
Step 2 Sample the VAR coe¢ cients from its conditional posterior distributionH (bj; Yt) ~N (M; V )
where:
M
(N(NP+1))1
=
 
H 1 +  1 
X 0tXt
 1 
H 1~b0 +  1 
X 0tXtb^

; (8)
V 
(N(NP+1))(N(NP+1))
=
 
H 1 +  1 
X 0tXt
 1
: (9)
Once M and V  are calculated, the VAR coe¢ cients are drawn from the normal distribution:
b1
((N(NP+1))1)
= M
((N(NP+1))1)
+
"
b
(1(N(NP+1)))
 (V )1=2
(N(NP+1))(N(NP+1))
#
: (10)
Step 3 Draw  from its conditional distributionH (nb; Yt) ~IW
 
; T + 

where  = S+
 
Yt  XtB1
0  
Yt  XtB1

where B1 is the previous draw of the VAR coe¢ cients reshaped into a matrix with dimensions
(N  P + 1)N so it is conformable with Xt:
2 Appendix II: Dataset for macroeconomic uncertainty
This section describes the data used for the construction of the macroeconomic uncertainty in-
dex. The 51 macroeconomic series included are selected to represent broad categories in the UKs
economic and nancial activity and some key global indicators. The main challenge for the data
collection was the availability of UK series starting in 1970s with quarterly frequency. There is
a higher availability for UK macroeconomic series starting in 1975. The series which were nally
included are coming from the following data sources: O¢ ce of National Statistics (ONS), the Bank
of Englands long run database (BOE), OECD, Global Financial Data (GFD), St. Louis Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED), .These categories include prices, nancial markets, money and
credit, government.
In the list below it can be found the short name of the series included in the macro data set,
the code in the database of their origin, a short description and the transformation applied. The
series span from 1970:Q1 to 2016:Q3.
The transformations are as follows: lv : no transformation (in levels), lv : rst di¤erence in
levels, ln : natural logarithm,  ln : rst di¤erence of the natural logarithms.
The series have been also seasonally adjusted when necessary.
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ID Description Short Name Transfor Source
Output, Production and Investment
NPEN Business Investment, SA bus_invest Δln ONS
UKGFCF..D Gross Fixed Capital Formation, SA invest Δln GFD
GDPCGBR Great Britain Real GDP in 2008 Pounds, SA gdp Δln GFD
UKCNPER.D Final Consumption Expenditure, SA cons_exp Δln ONS
UKPERSAVE Households Saving Ratio, SA saving_r Lv ONS
UKPERDISD Households Disposable Income, SA disp_inc Δln ONS
UKPROFTSB Total Gross Operating Surplus of Corporations, SA oper_surp Δln ONS
UKNEWORDD New Orders, Construction, New Work, Total, SA n_ord_constr Δln ONS
GBRPROINDAISAProduction of Total Industry , SA tot_prod Δln GFD
GDPCSGBR Change in Stocks/Inventories (GDP Basis), SA invent Lv GFD
Employment
UNGBRM Great Britain Unemployment Rate, SA unem Lv GFD
EMCPGBRQ Great Britain Compensation of Employees, SA comp_empl Δln GFD
A4YN Output per worker, Whole Economy: % SA output_worker Lv ONS
DMWR Output per job, Whole Economy: %  SA output_job Lv ONS
DYDC Workforce Jobs, Total, SA workforce Δln ONS
Housing
GBRPERMITQISQPermits Issued for Dwelling in United Kingdom, SA perm_d Δln GFD
UKOCFIHSD Housing, Constant Prices, SA, 2013 Prices housing Δln OECD
Trade
UKEXNGS.D Exports of Goods and Services, Const. Prices SA exports Δln ONS
UKIMNGS.D Imports, Goods and Services, Const. Prices  SA imports Δln ONS
UKCURBALB Balance of Payments : Current Account Balance, SA bop Δlv ONS
Prices
LEIGBRM Composite Leading Indicators com_lead_indic Lv GFD
CPGBRM Retail Price Index Inflation Rate rpi Δln GFD
CPGBRCM Consumer Price Index cpi Δln GFD
WPGBRM Producer Price Index ppi Δln GFD
UKGDPIPDE Implicit Price Deflator defl Δln ONS
CPEGBRM Consumer Price Index Inflation Rate: Energy cpi_enrg Δln ONS
RTGBRM Total Retail Trade ret_trade Δln GFD
K22A Index of Production: Manufacturing, SA manufa Δln ONS
BRT_D Brent Crude Oil (USD per Barrel) brent Δln GFD
Financial data
Interest and Exchange Rates
IMGBRD Overnight Interest Rate overnight_r Δlv GFD
ITGBR3D UK 3-month Treasury Bill Yield m3tbill Δlv GFD
IBGBR3D UK 3-month Interbank Rate m3interbank_r Δlv GFD
IGGBR5D UK 5-year Government Note Yield yield5 Δlv GFD
IGGBR10D UK 10-year Government Bond Yield yield10 Δlv GFD
IGGBR20D UK 20-year Government Bond Yield yield20 Δlv GFD
Macroeconomic Data
ID Description Short Name Transfor Source
INGBRW Corporate Bond Yields corp_yield Δlv GFD
GBPUSD US Dollars per British Pound dol_pound Δln GFD
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate NEER Lv OECD
Financial Markets
_DFTASD UK FT-Actuaries Dividend Yield (w/GFD extension) divyield Lv GFD
_PFTASD UK FT-Actuaries PE Ratio (w/GFD extension) pe_ratio Δlv GFD
_TFTASD UK FTSE All-Share Return Index (w/GFD extension) dftseall Δln GFD
Money and Credit
Break-adjusted monthly bank lending series 
excluding lending to intermediate OFCs b_lending Δln BOE*
Break-adjusted M4 series , 1880-2014, SA m4 Δln BOE*
FXRGBRM Total Foreign Exchange Reserves exc Gold, SA frn_resrv Δln GFD
MSGBRM1 M1 Money Supply, SA m1 Δln GFD
ILGBRMM United Kingdom Mortgage Lending Rate lend_rate Lv GFD
MSGBRM0 UK Bank of England Currency in Circulation, SA currency Δln GFD
QGBPAM770A Total Credit to Private Non-Financial Sector, SA credit Δln FRED
Government
NMRY General Govrn.: Final consumption expenditure: SA gov_expend Δln ONS
RYFD NET: UK public sector securities net_pub_sec Lv ONS
JW2O Total current receipts: Public sector excluding public sector banks, £m CPNSAps_ eceipts Δln ONS
JW2Q Total current expenditure: Public sector excluding public sector banks, £m CPNSA£m CPNSAps_expend Δln ONS
World
Real GDP Germany Index, SA ger_gdp Δln OECD
Real GDP France Index, SA fr_gdp Δln OECD
Real GDP US Index, SA us_gdp Δln OECD
_SPXD S&P 500 Composite Price Index (w/GFD extension) sp500 Δln GFD
_FFYD USA Federal Funds Rate Market Rate ffrate Lv GFD
IGUSA10D USA 10-year Bond Constant Maturity Yield us10yy Lv GFD
US Consumer Price Index, SA uscpi Δln OECD
* The long run database from the Bank of England has been used for these series
